Abstract. In this paper we present a veri cation methodology, using an action-based logic, able to check properties for full CCS terms, allowing also veri cation on in nite state systems. Obviously, for some properties we are only able to give a semidecision procedure. The idea is to use (a sequence of) nite state transition systems which approximate the, possibly in nite state, transition system corresponding to a term. To this end we de ne a particular notion of approximation, which is stronger than simulation, suitable to de ne and prove liveness and safety properties of the process terms.
Introduction
Many veri cation environments are presently available which can be used to automatically verify properties of reactive systems speci ed by means of process algebras, with respect to behavioural relations and logical properties. Most of these environments 7, 12, 14, 21] are based on the hypothesis that the system can be modelled as a nite state Labelled Transition Systems (LTS) and that the logic properties are regular properties. That is, no means are provided to deal with non-nite state LTS's. Usually, in these environments, to avoid the nontermination of the generation phase a term must satisfy some niteness syntactic conditions: in the case of CCS, for example, terms where a process variable x occurs in a parallel composition belonging to the de nition of x are not handled 24] .
We are interested here to deal with non nite-state systems; approaches have been proposed to this aim, which are not based on LTS's 1, 4, 16, 17, 18] ; we consider instead LTS based veri cation. The idea is to use, for proving a logical property, a sequence of nite state LTSs approximating the, possibly in nite state, LTS corresponding to a term by the standard CCS semantics.
In this paper we present a veri cation methodology to check properties expressed in ACTL, an action based logic 11], on full CCS terms (with no syntactic restriction), thus allowing complete generality of the class of reactive systems to be speci ed. We are able to carry on the veri cation even though the "usual" LTS generation fails. Obviously, for some of the properties, we are able to give only a semidecision procedure. This procedure is based on a notion of approximation and on the study of the ACTL properties preserved by the approximation. In this way, we can infer the satisfaction of a property by the whole system from the satisfaction of the property by a chain of approximations. In particular, we de ne an approximation chain, denoted as fN i g, which is very expressive with respect to liveness properties.
In order to reason on the properties that we are able to prove with approximation chains, we start giving a syntactic characterization of di erent kinds of properties. Moreover, we de ne a criterion to compare the suitability of approximation chains to prove properties. Following this notion, we formalize the fact that a chain is "better" than another one, if its set of provable properties is greater. Our work di ers from the abstract interpretation approaches for model checking of transition systems 2, 6, 8] since we do not build an abstract (with respect to values) model on which the properties are proved, but a suitable chain of nite labelled transition systems based on the operational semantics: when dealing with in nite systems, this allows us to choose the approximation level case by case. Although the main goal of the presented approach is to verify (classes) of non-nite state systems, it can also be seen as a way to accomplish "on the y" model checking, similarly to the "on the y" equivalence veri cation proposed in 13].
Background

CCS
We summarize the most relevant de nitions regarding CCS, and refer to 23] for more details. The CCS syntax is the following: p ::= :p j nil j p + p j pjp j pnA j x j p f] Terms generated by p (Terms) are called process terms (called also processes or terms); x ranges over a set fX; Y; ::g, of process variables. A process variable is de ned by a process de nition x def = p, (p is called the expansion of x). As usual, there is a set of visible actions V is = fa; a; b; b; :::g over which ranges, while ; range over Act = V is f g, where denotes the so-called internal action. We denote by the action complement: if = a, then = a, while if = a, then = a. By nil we denote the empty process. The operators to build process terms are pre xing ( :p), summation (p + p), parallel composition (pjp), restriction (pnA) and relabelling (p f]), where A V is and f : V is ! V is.
Given a term p, an occurrence of a process variable x is guarded in p if it is within some sub-term of the form :q. We assume that (i) V is is nite; (ii) for each de nition x def = p, each occurrence of each process variable is guarded in p; (iii) all terms are closed, i.e. all variables occurring in a term are de ned.
An operational semantics OP is a set of inference rules de ning a relation D Terms Act Terms. The relation is the least relation satisfying the rules. :ff. Moreover, we will write _ 0 for :(: ^: 0 ). An action formula permits the expression of constraints on the actions that can be observed (along a path or after next step); for instance, _ says that the only possible observations are or , while tt stands for "all actions are allowed" and ff for "no actions can be observed", that is only silent actions can be performed.
The satisfaction of an action formula by an action , j = , is de ned inductively by: j = i = ; j = : i not j = ; j = ^ 0 i j = and j = 0
Given an action formula , the set of the actions satisfying can be given by the function : AF(V is) ! 2 V is as follows:
The syntax of ACTL is de ned by the state formulae generated by the following grammar:
::= tt j ^ j : j E j A ::= X j X j U j U 0 where ; 0 range over action formulae, E and A are path quanti ers, X and U are next and until operators respectively.
Let Several useful modalities can be de ned, starting from the basic ones. In particular, we will write:
{ A e X for :EX : and E e X for :AX : . These are called the weak next operators.
{ EF for E(tt tt U ), and AF for A(tt tt U ); these are called the eventually operators.
{ EG for :AF: , and AG for :EF: ; these are called the always operators. ACTL can be used to de ne liveness (something good eventually happen) and safety (nothing bad can happen) properties of reactive systems. In a branching time logic both liveness and safety properties could be divided into two classes: universal liveness (safety) properties and existential liveness (safety) properties. The former state that a condition holds at some (all) states of all computation paths. The latter state that a condition holds at some (all) states of one computation path. Moreover liveness properties can be better classi ed as in the following 19, 22]: Termination properties: "a good thing happens at some states of a (all) computation(s)". Recurrence properties: "a good thing happens at in nitely many states of a (all) computation(s)". Persistence property: "a good thing happens at all but nitely many states of a (all) computation(s)". We can also talk of nite properties, that state some condition on the nite initial part of the behaviour of the system.
In nite state systems and logical properties
We know that all ACTL formulae are decidable on nite state transition systems and the linear time ACTL model checker 10] can be used to do this job. Hence, when we have a CCS description of a system and we want to prove on it ACTL properties, the labeled transition system associated to it needs to be built. This will be the model on which the satis ability of the formulae will be checked. Problems, obviously, arise when the system to be modelled has an in nite state representation, due for example to the interplay between parallel composition and recursion operators.
As an example, let us consider the CCS de nition of a bag containing two kinds of elements: X = p1:(g1:niljX) + p2:(g2:niljX) where p 1 and p 2 represent insertions and g 1 and g 2 deletions of the two kinds of elements, respectively. It is known that X is neither nite state nor contextfree. Some typical properties of a bag could be requested to be checked on this speci cation, in order to validate it: 1) The bag is not a set, therefore it is possible to put twice the same value in the bag consecutively: AFAX p1 EX p1 tt.
2) It is possible, on all (but nitely many) states to do a put action immediately followed by a get action: EFEG(EX p1 EX g1 tt).
3) There exists a computation path on which it is possible to do in nitely often put actions: EGAF(EX p1_p2 tt). 4) It is always possible to perform a put action: AGEX p1_p2 tt.
Veri cation by approximations
Let us rst present a syntactic characterization, as ACTL formulae, of the logical properties we will deal with. We then introduce the general notion of chain of nite approximations of the transition system of a term p. Finally, we introduce a notion of approximation suitable to prove liveness properties. The given syntactical presentation of liveness and safety properties does not obviously cover all the liveness and safety properties expressible by means of all the ACTL operators as the negation operator. Indeed, negation makes the syntactic classi cation of formulae di cult. Following this classi cation, we have that properties 1) to 3) of the bag example are liveness properties, while 4) is a safety one.
Finite, liveness and safety properties are decidable on a nite state LTS. In general, while nite properties are provable, liveness (including termination, persistence and recurrence) and safety properties can be undecidable for a nonnite state term p.
Approximation chains
Given a CCS term p, we de ne chains of nite LTSs which more and more accurately simulate the behaviour of SOS(p). Since each LTS in a chain is nite proof checking methodologies for nite LTSs can be used. First we de ne in the most general way the concept of approximation chain. In the following we denote, with T and T, the set of all LTSs and a generic LTS, respectively. De nition 3.6 (Approximation chain) Let The above de nitions allow us to de ne a procedure for proving the validity of a property on an in nite state-system, by checking the property on the elements of an approximation chain, starting from the rst one, until we nd that the property is veri ed. The procedure is sound if the chain preserves the property, i.e. it must happen that, if we are able to prove on an element of the chain, we can assert the validity of on SOS(p). This means that the property must be monotonic on the preorder. The rst result we show is that simulation, from now on denoted by s , is not suitable to prove all liveness properties. Each path contains a state from which all the outcoming arcs are labelled by a, expressed by (AF AX a tt) and the transition systems TS 1 and TS 2 in Figure 2 . We have that TS 1 s TS 2 , but TS 1 veri es the property and TS 2 does not.
In order to manage all liveness properties, we now introduce a stronger notion of simulation between transition systems. This notion, in contrast to simulation, permits the de nition of approximation chains that preserve the branching structure, that is, for each approximation, if a node has been exploded, all its branches have been developed. Figure 2 .
The notion of approximation chain based on BC-simulation preserves the branching structure of the transition systems all along the chain. This allow us to prove properties not provable on a chain based on simulation. One of the main results of the paper is the following: Proposition 3.2 bc preserves liveness properties. Proof sketch By structural induction on the structure of the liveness formulae and taking into account that the liveness properties are de ned on a positive fragment of ACTL and that the BC-simulation forces the simulating transition system to exactly maintain all the (bisimilar) branches of the simulated one, if any.
It is now easy to relate approximation chains, based on BC-simulation, with liveness properties. The following proposition is the basis of our veri cation method. Let us now consider safety properties. It is easy to convince ourselves that we are not able to prove the satis ability of a safety property by only using approximations of the given system. In fact, if we consider the syntax on which safety properties are de ned, we note that each formula belonging to this ACTL subset is constituted by next modalities, with no negations, under a quanti ed always modality. Now, the next modality cannot be veri ed on all the states of a TS that have no successor. Therefore, the whole safety formula cannot be veri ed (consider for example the formula AGAX a tt on TS 1 ). On the other hand, if a safety property is true on a bc -approximation of a system, then such an approximation has at least one cyclic path that makes the formula true. This is enough to deduce that the formula is true on the SOS representation of the system. Indeed, the following proposition can be stated: A proof methodology can be derived for safety properties, starting from the above result. Unfortunately only a limited subclass of such properties are provable when nite approximations are considered for non-nite state systems: for example, on a non-nite state system we cannot prove any universal safety property. We can however de ne a proof methodology that takes into account the duality existing between liveness properties and safety ones. In this respect, we provide a method to prove the non-validity of a safety property on a nite approximation. To make this possible we need to forget that we are working on nite approximations in which there exist states with no successors and on which every safety formula is false. This can be done considering a weaker version of the safety property under study, by substituting the next modalities with weak next modalities. Now, if this weak formula is false on one of the approximations p it will necessarily be false on SOS(p). This idea is formalized by the following:
De nition 3.9 (Weak nite property) We say that is a weak nite property if it can be expressed by an ACTL formula de ned by the following grammar:
::= tt j ^ j _ j E j A ::= e X j e X De nition 3.10 (Weak safety property) We say that is a weak safety property if = AG or = EG and is a weak nite property.
For weak safety properties, the following proposition holds :
Proposition 3. Since nite properties represent a particular class of liveness properties we have a semidecision procedure for testing the validity of these properties by using approximation chains based on bc . We can do more, as one should have expected, and provide a decision procedure for nite properties. To this end, we furtherly constrain our chains. Let us consider, for example, the following nite property for SOS(p) for some p: All paths start with the action b and contain at least an action a as a second action (AX b EX a tt). Approximation chains based on bc are not suitable to give a positive or negative answer if SOS(p) is in nite: in fact a new path of length 2 may appear in whatever element of the chain. The property is decidable if, instead, each transition system T i (p) of the chain grows on all possible paths with respect to T i?1 (p). This suggests the following notion:
De nition 3.11 (Transition system path-approximation) Let 
How to build approximations
In this section, we present some ways of constructing approximation chains. In order to obtain correct approximations for a term p, the idea is to derive p using the operational semantics until some stopping condition, thus obtaining a partial transition system, which is furtherly expanded to obtain the successive elements of the chain. The rst chain we present, described in the following sub-secton, is based on the standard SOS semantics. In order to obtain better approximations, we then introduce a second chain, which is based on a di erent semantics, able to produce "more expressive" transition systems. Actually, the chain fM i (p)g is the simplest chain derivable from SOS(p) which is a bc -approximation chain. In fact the simpler approximation chain which at any step adds a single new transition to the previous element of the chain, is not a bc -approximation chain. Example 1. Let us now reconsider the bag example of section 2.3, and try to prove the properties on the chain fM i (X)g. Since fM i (X)g is a bc -approximation chain, it preserves all properties from 1) to 3) and does not preserve the safety property 4). Thus, if we nd that an approximation M i (X) veri es a property among 1) and 3), we prove that the property holds for the bag (i.e. SOS(X)). M 0 (X) is given by a transition system with only one state, i.e. X itself, while M 1 (X) and M 2 (X) are represented in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. We have that property 1) is not satis ed by M 1 (X), it is satis ed by M 2 (X) and thus it is true for the bag. Moreover, property 4) is not veri ed by M 1 (X) and M 2 (X); on the other hand, its weak version (AGE e X p1_p2 tt) is veri ed by both M 1 (X) and M 2 (X); this does not allow us to deduce anything about the satisi ability of the safety property for the bag. Properties 2) and 3) are not veri ed by M 1 (X) neither by M 2 (X). It is easy to see that these properties are not veri ed by any M i (X), for each i. In fact their satis ability implies detecting a cycle in the transition system: this cycle will never appear in the chain fM i (X)g.
SOS approximations
Thus, if we use this chain to approximate SOS(X), these properties are not provable, while they hold for SOS(X). Nothing can instead be asserted about property 4). The following proposition states that each M i is a i -approximation of SOS(p), i.e. the size of the transition system grows. As a consequence, using fM i (p)g we can decide any nite property of depth n of a term p: it su cies to check the property on M n (p).
SS Approximations
In this section, we present a way of approximating SOS(p) based on a di erent operational semantics, which allows us to prove a greater set of properties than those proved by fM i (p)g. In 9] the semantics SS was de ned, which is more abstract than SOS, since the SS rules have built in some behavioural equivalence axioms, i.e. they accomplish some simpli cations on the terms during the derivations, with the purpose of obtaining, if possible, a nite-state transition system for p. The rules of SS are such that SS(p) is strongly equivalent to SOS(p). The de nition of SS, whose rules are shown in Figure 7 , is based on the following considerations. Given the CCS syntax, those operators that, in presence of recursion, would give rise to the derivation of growing terms (and therefore to an in nite number of derivations) are parallel composition, restriction and relabelling. For restriction and relabelling, in a language with nite action set, the unlimited growth of terms can be prevented by using suitable inference rules. In fact, successive, possibly intermixed, occurrences of restriction and relabelling can be reduced to only one restriction, followed by only one relabelling. Moreover, the parallel operator can be deleted as soon as one of the two arguments terminates, i.e. is equivalent to nil. The SS inference rules accomplish these strong equivalence preserving simpli cations during the derivation. The following notation is used in the rules: Proof. The nite paths are equal in M i (p) and N i (p), since they are both i SOS(p). Moreover, it holds that: 8s 2 S Mi ; 9s 0 2 S Ni such that s s 0 and length(s 0 ) lengh(s), where length(t) denotes the number of operators occurring in the term t. This holds since terms generated by SS are "shorter" than terms generated by SOS. Consider an in nite path in M i (p), i.e. a path leading from a state s 2 S Mi to itself and take n equal to the number of terms t equivalent to s and such that length(t) lengh(s). Take j = i + n. Note that the converse of the above proposition is not true: if we consider the bag example, no M i (X) exists which is bc N 2 (X).
Suitability of approximation chains
Let us consider a liveness property and a bc -approximation chain fT i (p)g for a term p. Proposition 3.3 above ensures that, if we are able to prove on an element of the chain, we can assert the validity of on SOS(p). Thus an algorithm to check the validity of a liveness property is that of checking it on the elements of the chain, starting from the rst one, until we nd that the property is veri ed. But the converse of proposition 3.3 is not true in general: if a liveness property is veri ed on SOS(p), this does not imply that it is true for some fT i (p)g. Thus, given an approximation chain, the above algorithm (which checks a liveness property on the elements of the chain) is not in general a semidecision procedure for the validity of a formula. This is the case of the chain fM i (p)g and the properties 2) and 3) of our example above. Moreover, di erent approximation chains for the same term can be used to check di erent sets of properties, in the sense that, given a property , it is possible that the above algorithm is a semidecision procedure for if using a chain, while it cannot be used to semidecide the validity with another chain. This suggests a comparison criterion on the suitability of approximation chains for proving liveness properties.
De nition 5.1 (Checkable properties) Let Note that the notion of suitability of approximation chains is di erent from a notion considering the "growing rate" of the chains. Given, for example, an approximation chain fT i (p)g, let us consider the chain containing a subset of the elements of fT i (p)g, for example the elements of even position, i.e. fS i (p)g = fT 0 (p); T 2 (p); T 4 (p); g. We have that fS i (p)g grows faster than fT i (p)g, but it is not more suitable. As a consequence of the above de nitions and propositions 4. 4 6 Implementation in the JACK environment The JACK system 3] is a veri cation environment for process algebra description languages. It is able to cover a large extent of the formal software development process, such as rewriting techniques, behavioural equivalence proofs, graph transformations, and (ACTL) logic veri cation. In JACK a particular description format is used to represent TSs, the so called format commun fc2, that has been proposed as standard format for automata 20]. The ACTL model checker was built on the basis of an algorithm similar to that of the EMC model checker 5], so it guarantees model checking of an ACTL formula on a TS in a linear time complexity 10].
The JACK environment has been extended with a tool to build the chain fN i (p)g. We now describe the methodology for proving properties. Let be given a CCS term p and a list of ACTL formulae to be checked on it. A veri cation session has the following steps: 1. The term is input to JACK. If the term satis es the niteness condition of the transition system generator inside JACK, a corresponding transition system TS is built and the list of ACTL formulae is checked on it. The session terminates. 2. If the syntactic niteness conditions are not satis ed, then we call the chain generator of JACK. Once obtained the rst approximation N 1 (p), we put TS := N 1 (p). 3. The list of ACTL formulae is input to the model checker which checks them on TS. If N i+1 (p) = TS, the session terminates, since TS SOS(p). Otherwise, the results of the model checker are analyzed according to propositions 3.3, 3.5 and 3.7. This means that, possibly, a new approximation is built, i.e. TS := N i+1 (p) and we repeat step 3.
